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Abstract 
This paper assesses the causal effect of relaxing equity constraints on the cultivation of tobacco in 
Malawi, a crop viewed by the local population as Malawi’s green gold. Applying the 
counterfactual outcome framework we find that relaxing equity constraints substantially increases 
the amount of tobacco land cultivated by smallholder farmers, suggesting that there is scope for 
increasing tobacco production once equity constraints are relaxed among producers. These 
findings provide justification for extensive public financing of tobacco production in Malawi.   
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1.0 Introduction 
 
Faced with limited mineral resources, agricultural exports are a major source of foreign 
exchange earning for Malawi and the agricultural export base is dominated by tobacco, a crop  
viewed by the local population as Malawi’s green gold, which contributes over 70 percent of the 
country’s total export earnings (Jaffee, 2003). Currently, Malawi ranks among the top three world 
exporters of two types of tobacco; namely, fire-cured and burley. This is believed to be a 
consequence of the comparative advantage the country enjoys in the production of tobacco. Two 
decades after the launch of the anti- smoking campaigns and the steady decline in the tobacco 
world market prices, the Government of Malawi continues to face problems in diversifying away 
from tobacco despite the well acknowledged risks associated with over-dependency on one  crop 
for export.    
Consistent with this observation  Mataya and Tsonga (1999) report that although the 
country has a potential to diversify beyond tobacco through commodities that are of high- value 
and less bulky such as spices, oil seeds, some horticultural crops, cotton and pulses, constraints 
such as the lack of a policy framework and a strategy for implementation, poor dissemination of 
technical and economic information about the crops, inadequate value-adding activities, and 
deficient access to production facilities continue to impede the diversification efforts. Tobacco is 
the only crop in Malawi which can be exported without value adding and still fetches better prices 
while other potential crops require value adding before they can fetch a price equivalent to that of 
tobacco. It is partly for this reason that Malawi might continue to rely on tobacco as the major 
source of foreign exchange.  The argument above provides justification for a further investment 
in its production. 
 However, considering that tobacco production is capital intensive, the participation of 
poor households characterized by equity failure, in its production poses a big challenge. 
Furthermore the pro-poor focus of current government policies suggest the need for increased  
participation of the poor in productive activities and the development process as whole as a 
means to achieving meaningful and equitable growth. Therefore, the advocacy for credit support 
to households interested in producing tobacco, but are facing equity failure is justifiable and   
consistent with the general investment theory under equity failure.   Several authors ( eg .Eswaran 
and Kotwal (1990); Zeller Diagne and Mataya (1998); and Feder and Umali (1993)) have 
reported on the positive effects of access to credit on agricultural production.   Zeller Diagne and  
Mataya (1998) report that  although an increase in the land allocated to tobacco in Malawi in the 
late 1990’s was a result of a policy reform that increased the tobacco quota  to small holder 
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farmers, access to credit significantly increased the share of land allocated to tobacco at 
household level. This observation would seem to suggest that the absence of credit or indeed 
credit constraints limit the production of tobacco.   
Nonetheless, de Janvry et al. (1997) argue that a lack of access to credit may not 
necessarily imply an unmet credit need. The preceding argument suggests that credit targeted at 
households that do not have unmated credit needs, will simply act as a substitute to their income 
and it will not have the same effect as when it is targeted at those with a genuine credit need.  Due 
to difficulties in identifying the credit constraint status of a household, most studies resort to a 
simple measure of credit access; the amount of money borrowed by a household, which does not 
tell anything about the credit-constraint status (see for example , Simtowe, Diagne and Zeller 
2008).  This study used a rich set of data set collected by the International Food Policy 
Research Institute (IFPRI) in Malawi in 1994 to assess the impact of credit constraints on the 
cultivation of Tobacco. Using the direct elicitation approach proposed by   Jappelli (1990), 
Diagne, Zeller and Sharma (2000) and Sawada et al. (2006), households are classified 
into credit constrained and unconstrained regimes. A simple comparison of the average 
tobacco land cultivated between equity constrained and the unconstrained households 
show no significant differences between the two groups. Similarly results based on the 
propensity score matching method  do not show any significant difference in land 
cultivated for tobacco between constrained and unconstrained household. However, 
results based on the fuzzy regression approach using eligibility into a credit program as 
an instrument show that relaxing equity constraints increases  the amount of land 
allocated to tobacco. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in section two we 
present a review of tobacco production in Malawi. In section three we present the 
empirical framework and an econometric specification of the empirical model.  The data 
used for the estimation is described in section four. In section five we present and discuss 
results, while section six concludes.    
 
 
2.0 Tobacco production in Malawi: a review 
 
Malawi has a long history of tobacco production dating as far back as the 1890’s. By 1964 
tobacco had become the most important export crop for Malawi. Until the 1980’s, participation in 
the production of tobacco was restricted to what Jaffee (2003) calls an elite cadre of growers who 
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owned or leased estates.  Smallholder farmers were restricted in the varieties of tobacco which 
they could cultivate and were restricted to whom they could sell. Most small holder tobacco was 
sold to government agencies where they received lower prices than the prevailing market prices 
while large farmers could sell their tobacco directly to the international buyers. As noted by 
Jaffee, the special crops Act (1964) restricted small holder farmers from cultivating higher value 
crops such as burley and flue-cured varieties of tobacco. During the 1980’s government 
encouraged the establishment of mini estates (10-20 hectares) for the production of tobacco 
resulting into the growth of the industry. By 1994 the government amended a special crops Act 
and expanded tobacco sales quotas to groups of smallholder farmers. This led to an increase in 
the land allocated to burley tobacco as indicated in Figure 1. The area of land located to all types 
of tobacco steadily increased from about 33,000 hectares in 1987 to about 127000 hectares in 
2003.  
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Figure 1: Trend in Area cultivated and  annual growth rate  for all Tobacco and burley Tobacco 
Source: Government of Malawi statistics  (2007) 
 
Most of the increase in the land allocated to tobacco was a result of the extensive cultivation on 
burley tobacco by small holder farmers.  The full liberalization of burley tobacco growing for the 
small holder farmers in 1994, led to an increase in proportion of land allocated to burley tobacco 
from 22 percent in 1994 to about 84 percent in 2003.  Zeller, Diagne and Mataya (1998) note that 
the increase in the tobacco quota for small holder farmers was supported with   improved access 
to extension, credit, inputs and improved access to markets that offered them with good prices at 
the auction floors. 
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The increase in the production of tobacco meant that more households are participating in one 
way or another in the tobacco industry. Today the tobacco industry provides employment to 
approximately 1.1 million workers and 390 thousand tenants. Tobacco is the most widely grown 
crop after maize covering more than 1,500 hectares of land (Government of Malawi, 2000). 
Interestingly, even after such an increase in the land allocated to tobacco Malawi still fails to 
meet its tobacco quota at the world market.  Malawi’s total tobacco production is currently 
estimated at 90 million kilograms against a total demand of 140 million kilograms estimated by 
the Tobacco Exporters Association of Malawi (TEAM). Two factors are believed to explain this 
gap between the supply and demand. The first is the fluctuating and lower than average price 
price-setting that discourages production. Related to this is the limited effective demand for 
fertilizers due to limited access to credit for financing tobacco production (Tchale et al., 20001).  
 
So far there is limited literature that has seriously looked into the extent to which access to credit 
encourages households to participate in the production of tobacco. This study is a first attempt to 
fill this gap by investigating the role of credit on the adoption of tobacco while taking into 
account the household credit constraint status.  
 
 
3. Theoretical framework and econometric specification of the empirical model 
 
3.1 Identification of equity constraints 
 
The analysis in the present paper is based on the hypothesis that equity constraints are a 
barrier to the cultivation of tobacco by most poor households. We start by presenting a 
framework of household consumption and equity constraints and then apply it to the 
cultivation of tobacco.  Following Diagne and Zeller (2001), Jappelli (1990), and Sawada 
et al. (2006) we construct a qualitative response model of endogenous credit constraint by 
defining an indicator variable of credit constraints cc . We do so by assuming that a 
household consumes some amount of goods C  in a given period of time. Let *C  
represent the optimal consumption in the absence of credit constraints. CC =*  (the 
actual consumption) if the credit constraint is not binding; CC >*  if the credit constraint 
is binding. The gap between optimal consumption and the actual consumption measures 
the existence or not of a credit constraint.   We assume that the consumption gap is 
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defined as ** CCH −= .  According to Jappelli (1990), Sawada et al. (2006) and Gilligan 
et al. (2005), there are two factors that determine whether or not a household will face 
credit constraints. The first factor is the demand for credit which is the difference 
between household resource endowment and desired consumption. The second factor 
relates to the supply of credit by financial institutions. The optimal consumption *C  and 
the maximum available credit to the household can both be expressed as a linear function 
of observables such as the household’s human and physical capital.  A reduced form 
equation of the consumption gap can thus be written as follows: 
 
μγ += wH*      (1) 
 
=cc ⎪⎩
⎪⎨⎧ ≥
<
00
01
*
*
Hif
Hif
 
Where: 
w   represents household and farm characteristics that determine credit demand 
as well as the supply of credit to the household.  
μ  is a random error term with zero mean.   
A household is said to have a binding credit constraint if H*<0 and thus cc=1. The credit 
constraint is not binding if  0* ≥H and thus 0=cc   
 
3.2 The causal effect of relaxing equity constraint and the counterfactual 
framework 
The analysis on the effected of relaxing equity constraints on the cultivation of 
tobacco is guided by a Counterfactual framework proposed Rubin (1974) which assumes 
that each farm household has ex-ante two potential outcomes: an outcome when under 
equity failure that we denote by y1 and an outcome when equity constraints are relaxed 
which we denote y0.2  Letting binary treatment variable cc  to stand for the equity 
constraint status, with cc  =0 meaning equity constrained,  and cc  =1 for the non 
constrained, we can write the observed outcome y of any farm household as a function of 
                                                 
2 The outcome analyzed in the empirical section is the amount of land cultivated for tobacco  
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the two potential outcomes: y = ccy1 + (1-cc)y0 where y1 is the outcome when under 
treatment (relaxed equity constraint), and y0  is outcome when not receiving treatment 
(constrained). For any household the causal effect of relaxing equity constraints on its 
observed outcome y can be expressed as the difference of its two potential outcomes: 
 y1 - y0. However the two potential outcomes are mutually exclusive for any household 
such that it is impossible to measure the individual effect of relaxing equity constraints on 
tobacco cultivation for given household. The challenge, therefore is to create a 
counterfactual sample that can be used as a control group to estimate the mean effect of 
relaxing equity constraints on tobacco cultivation among a population of households: 
E(y1-y0), where E is the mathematical expectation operator. Such a population parameter 
is called the average treatment effect (ATE). 
 
Several methods have been proposed to estimate the Average Treatment effect (ATE) and 
they include the matching methods, as well as regression and Instrumental variable based 
methods.However, matching methods only control for the observables that are 
responsible for one’s participation in a treatment, but they do not control for other 
unobservable characteristics that may also influence one’s participation in a treatment as 
well as the outcome of interest, ( see for example Lee, 2005; Rosenbaum, 2002; 
Heckman and Vytlacil,   2005; Rosenbaum, 2002).  Furthermore, in the presence of  the  
non-compliance problem whereby subjects may not stick to their assigned groups even if 
assignment to the treatment and controlled groups were to be done randomly as in 
controlled social experiments (Imbens and Rubin 1997; Heckman, 1996; Imbens and 
Angrist, 1994), the estimates from propensity score matching will be biased..  
 
In the present study of the effect of relaxing equity constraints through formal credit for 
eligible participants, noncompliance means that there are individual who can never 
borrow even though they area credit constrained because they are not eligible, and also 
that some households are not credit constrained and yet they are eligible to borrow. 
Therefore, under such a context (non-compliance), the ATE parameter estimated with the 
propensity score matching method does not identify the causal effect relaxing equity 
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constraints on the population.  Instead, it identifies what is defined in the evaluation 
literature as the intention-to-treat effect (ITT).    
 
Imbens and Angrist, 1994 indicate that in the presence of non-compliance, the impact 
parameter that identifies the causal effect on the outcome of interest is the local average 
treatment effect (LATE). This is the effect of a treatment on the subpopulation of  
“compliers”.In this context of this study  the subpopulation of compliers corresponds to 
that of eligible borrowers whose equity constraints could be relaxed through borrowing.  
Therefore, we estimate the potential effect of relaxing equity constraints on tobacco 
cultivation among smallholder farmers from Malawi that are eligible for tobacco credit 
from microfinance institutions and compare the results with estimates based on simple 
mean differences and propensity score matching methods that do not control for non-
compliance. .   
 
The econometric expression of relaxing equity constraints on the cultivation of tobacco 
can be presented in two interrelated equation as follows:.  The first equation is  equity 
constraint equation (equation no. 1) and the second (equation np.2) is the  tobacco 
cultivation equation in which the equity constraint status of a household (cc) is included 
as an explanatory variable as in the following equation: 
 
εβα ++= MMxccy    (2) 
Where, y  is the household’s land allocated to tobacco in each reference season,  Mx  is a 
matrix of household specific socioeconomic and demographic characteristics that affect 
tobacco cultivation. Variable  cc is an indicator of equity constraints which takes the 
value of zero if the equity credit constraint is binding and one  otherwise. It is assumed 
that relaxing equity constraints has a positive effect on the cultivation of tobacco. The last 
termε , is the error. Where ( εμ, ) is assumed to have zero mean, bivariate normal 
distribution with a unit variance and ),(1 εμρ Corr= . The covariate matrix is written as 
follows;  
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⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
1
ρ
ρ
σ
 
Green (2000) notes that if 01 ≠ρ , then μ  and ε   are correlated, and that an estimation of 
equation (2) is inconsistent for α andβ .    
 
Propensity score matching estimates 
 
In observational data it is not possible to calculate directly the difference in the outcome 
of interest between the treated and the control group, also known as the Average 
Treatment effect (ATE) due to the absence of the counterfactual. As a consequence data 
may be drawn from comparison units whose characteristics match those of the treated 
group. The average outcome of the untreated matched group is the assumed to identify 
the mean counterfactual outcome for the treated group in the absence of a treatment 
(Cameron and Trived, 2005). The estimation using propensity score matching is based on 
the conditional independence assumption which states that conditional on X 
(observables), the outcomes are independent of the treatment (cc). In the present study 
this can be expressed as follows:  
Xccyoyi |, ⊥   (3) 
Furthermore the propensity score matching methods is based on the overlap or matching 
(support condition) assumption. The assumption ensures that for each value of X, there 
are both treated and untreated cases. The assumption is expressed as follows: 
 
1]|1Pr[0 <=< xcc      (4) 
This implies that there is an overlap between the treated and untreated samples. Stated the 
other way round this also means that the control and treated populations have comparable 
observed characteristics.  The propensity score matching method matches treated and 
untreated cases on the propensity score rather than on the regressor. The propensity score  
which is the conditional probability of receiving treatment given X, is denoted  P(X). In 
literature, there are a number of matching methods, and in this paper we apply the  
nearest neighbors, kernel and radius  matching methods to assess the impact of relaxing 
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equity constraints on the cultivation of tobacco. The three methods are also used to test 
the robustness of the findings. 
 
Regression discontinuity design estimates 
 
The estimation based on propensity scores assumes continuity in all the observables. 
However in a special case of controlling for an observable variable where the probability of 
assignment to the treatment group is a discontinuous function of one or more observable variables 
( Duflo et al. 2006), propensity score matching methods do not yield reliable estimates  In the 
case of credit access, for example, most micro credit organizations limit eligibility for credit to 
households that meet a certain minimum criteria. For tobacco credit  in Malawi, the eligibility 
criteria comprise two important components. First, credit programs operating in Malawi 
provide group loans that are tied with a joint liability clause for the group members. 
Therefore, only individual belonging to a credit group have access (are eligible) to such 
loans.  Second, we note that most of the agricultural credit programs require that 
individuals at least own  0.5 acre of land, however for tobacco households are required to 
own at least 1 acre of land.  We find that for tobacco cultivation, the specified cutoff 
point for land size is quite relevant because households owning less than 1 acre of land 
and are risk averse, are more likely to prioritize the cultivation of maize as a food security 
crop before they allocate land to the more lucrative tobacco.   We therefore, generate an 
eligibility variable for an agricultural loan based on the two components; ie membership 
in a credit group and the minimum land holding size of 1 acre.   
 
We are interested to explore the potential effect of expanding credit access to eligible and 
equity constrained rural households on the cultivation of tobacco. Thus, our interest is 
only in a subpopulation of constrained households that are eligible to borrow.  This 
warrants the estimation of the Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) Abadie, 2003; 
Imbens and Angrist, 1994) as opposed to the Average Treatment Effect (ATE).  There are 
two forms of regression discontinuity designs. First is the sharp regression discontinuity 
design. In this design, assignment to treatment solely depends on whether observable pre-
intervention variables satisfy a set of conditions known to the analyst (Ichno, 2007). This 
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compares to a case where no household with land holding size below 1 acre accesses 
credit.  However in this study, we are not interested in households with access to credit 
but rather in households facing equity constraints.  We find that not all equity constrained 
households, are eligible to borrow for tobacco cultivation, and yet our interest is on credit 
constrained households that could borrow for tobacco cultivation. 
When not all households that are eligible to borrow are constrained (ie credit constrained 
households are found on both sides of the cut-off point -credit eligibility) and vice versa, 
a fuzzy regression discontinuity design exists (see Table 1) 
 
Table 1: Distribution of households cross the eligibility status and equity constraint 
 
Equity status Eligibility status 
Equity constrained Unconstrained  
Total 
    
Not Eligible 102 97 199 
Eligible 69 136 205 
    
Total 171 233 404 
Source: Own Calculations from Malawi-IFPRI Survey  
 
Duflo et al (2006) equates this situation to having no-shows (treatment group members 
who do not receive the treatment) and/or crossovers (control group members who do 
receive the treatment) in a randomized experiment. The existence of such mis-assignment 
makes it necessary to use a larger sample in order to preserve precision.  The usual 
approach for dealing with mis-assignment (in the case of a regression discontinuity 
design) or non-compliance (in the case of an experiment) involves a simple form of 
instrumental variables analysis. Thus in this study we employ  the Instrumental Variable 
(IV) method with the eligibility status as an instrument ( see for example Abadie, 2003; 
Imbens and Angrist, 1994) to estimate the potential effect of relaxing equity constraints 
through credit among households that are eligible to borrow from a microfinance 
institution. Different IV based estimators are available depending on functional form, 
assumptions and assumptions regarding the instrument and the unobserved 
heterogeneities.  
 
Equity constraints and tobacco production in Malawi 
 
 14
We assume a treatment effects model with  an endogenous binary treatment cc  and then 
estimate its effect on a continuous, fully observed variable y , conditional on the 
independent variables x and w . The primary interest is in the regression function 
(equation 2). In the proposed treatment model cc , is the endogenous dummy variable 
indicating whether the treatment is assigned or not. The binary outcome treatment cc  is 
modeled as the outcome of an unobserved latent variable *cc .  It is assumed that *cc  is 
a  function of the exogenous covariate w  and a random component u .  If we assume 
normality of distribution in the outcome of interest, the average treatment effect of 
relaxing equity constraints on the cultivation of tobacco conditional on the exogenous 
covariates  ( Yi | 1,| =ccxy Mi  derived from equations 1 and 2 can be estimated using a 
Full Information Maximum Likelihood  in STATA by executing the TREATREG 
command. The discussion of the procedure is discussed in  detail in Woodridge (2002) 
.Woodridge reports that a convincing identification of this  model requires that aleast one 
variable in  Mx  , ie a variable that determines one’s likelihood of facing liquidity 
constraints is excluded from the outcome equation (land cultivated for tobacco), also 
known as the exclusion restriction. The policy interest in this study is to examine the 
extent to which equity constrained rural households that are eligible to borrow money 
from a microfinance institution,  can use the money to expand their cultivation of 
tobacco. 
 
However considering that the outcome of interest (tobacco land cultivated) is left 
censored at zero- thus there are no individuals that cultivate less than zero acres of 
tobacco land- which also violates normality assumptions imbedded in the earlier 
estimation using TREATREG, we estimate a second IV estimator using the IVTOBIT 
procedure in STATA which addresses both the censoring problem as well as the 
regression discontinuity problem by  using  the eligibility criteria as an instrument. In so 
doing we estimate the Local Average Treatment Effect of relaxing equity constraints 
among eligible credit borrowers on the cultivation of tobacco. We assume that eligibility 
status is correlated with the equity status of the household as eligibility to credit may 
relax equity constraints. We however assume that eligibility to a credit program does not 
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directly affect the individual’s choice to produce tobacco except through the relaxation of 
the equity constraint which makes the eligibility criteria to be a valid and relevant 
instrument in the model.   
 
 
 
 
4.0 Data  
 
Financial services to micro enterprises and low income households in Malawi are 
provided by a variety and range of private and publicly supported Microfinance 
Institutions (MFIs) that include NGOs, Companies Limited by Guarantee, Savings and 
Credit Cooperatives and Commercial Banks including one bank specialized in 
microfinance.  In the present paper we use the data collected by the International Food 
Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) in collaboration with Bunda College in Malawi in 1994 
and which contains the necessary information needed to identify credit-constrained 
households as well as those that cultivated tobacco. The data set is certainly old which 
suggests that some conditions in Malawi in 2008 could be different from those in 1994 
although to a large extent the poverty levels,  the levels of access to financial services by 
the poor, as well as the structure of the  agricultural sector have mostly remained the 
same. Therefore, aside from explaining the current conditions, our aim is to illustrate how 
using a well established survey data, one could ultimately measure the effect of relaxing 
equity  constraints on technology adoption.   
 
The IFPRI Survey was designed to investigate the effects of access to credit on household 
welfare. The survey covered households from five districts of Rumphi, Nkhotakota, 
Dowa and Dedza and Mangochi. The four microcredit programs that were of focus for 
the survey included the Malawi Rural Finance Company (MRFC), a state-owned and 
nationwide agricultural credit program; Promotion of Micro-Enterprises for Rural 
Women (PMERW), a microcredit program targeted at women in support of nonfarm 
income-generating activities; the Malawi Mudzi Fund (MMF), a replica of the Grameen 
Bank; and the Malawi Union of Savings and Credit Cooperatives (MUSCCO), a union of 
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locally based savings and credit associations. The IFPRI survey focused on these four 
microfinance institutions as representative of the spectrum of formal credit and savings 
options available to rural households in Malawi.  The data were collected from members 
of credit programs as well as from non- credit program members.   The sample included 
404 households of which half were members of the credit programs and the other half 
were non-members.   
The survey questionnaire consisted of several modules including household socio-
demographics, crop and livestock production and credit and savings modules as well as 
Asset modules. The data are available on request from the International Food Policy 
Research Institute (IFPRI). 
In the IFPRI survey, respondents were asked whether or not they had tried to 
borrow from a formal lender in the past 12 months. Those who asked for loans were 
asked the amount they received and whether they received the full amount demanded.  
Those that had not attempted to borrow were asked about the reasons for not attempting 
to borrow. More precisely, the questions were as follows:  
1a  Did any member in your household apply for a loan from a formal institution in 
the last 12 months?  Yes/no 
1b If  household applied, was the loan granted ?  Yes/no 
1c If loan was granted was the household granted the same amount the loan as 
requested? Yes/no 
2 If household members had not attempted to borrow, give reasons. The choices for 
the answers were as follows;  
1= I did not need credit;    
2=I dislike any borrowing  
3= The loans are too expensive   
4= I would have liked to apply for a loan but did not apply because I felt that 
lender would not give me a loan because of my age 
5= I would have liked to apply for a loan but did not apply because I felt that 
lender would not give me a loan because of my health problems 
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6= I would have liked to apply for a loan but did not apply because I felt that 
lender would not give me a loan for other reasons other than age and health 
problems 
7=Others  
Respondents who chose any of the options 3, 4, 5 and 6 as reasons for not attempting to 
get a loan from a formal institution (question 2) are categorized as discouraged 
borrowers, and consistent with the credit literature, such households together with those 
that did not receive as much credit at the requested from the formal lender were classified 
ascredit constrained. About 43 percent of the surveyed households were classified as 
credit constrained.  
Table 2 presents household characteristics divided by credit constraint status. 
Unconstrained households have relatively larger households (6.1 persons) than 
constrained households (5.4 persons). Results further show that unconstrained households 
are wealthier with an average household asset value of MK 4168 compared to MK 3293 
for the credit constrained (at the time of the survey, 1 US Dollar was worth 44 Malawi 
Kwachas) Unconstrained households have a much smaller proportion of female-headed 
households (21%) than households that have some credit binding constraint (30%) 
suggesting that credit constraints in Malawi could be associated with the gender of 
household head. Unconstrained households have larger land holdings (2.47 hectares) than 
constrained households (1.8 hectares). There are no marked differences in terms of age,  
years of education of the head of household. 
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Table 2: Household characteristics by credit constraint status 
 
 Unconstrained 
households 
(n=233) 
Credit 
constrained  
households 
(n=171) 
Total 
(n=404) 
Age of head (years) 45.01 
(12.19) 
45.18 
(14.08) 
45.13 
(13.58) 
Years of schooling of head 4.65 
(3.46) 
4.15 
(3.25) 
4.28 
(3.31) 
Sex of head  of household (1=male, 0=female) 0.79 
(0.41) 
0.70 
(0.46) 
0.72 
(0.45) 
Population males 15 to 64  years  1.27 
(1.03) 
1.21 
(0.83) 
1.22 
(0.89) 
Population females 15 to 64  years 1.48 
(0.77) 
1.47 
(0.83) 
1.47 
(0.81) 
Household size 6.10 
(2.83) 
5.41  
(2.46) 
5.59 
(2.58) 
Total hectares of household land 2.47 
(2.51) 
1.87 
(1.66) 
2.03 
(1.93) 
Distance to Field assistant (kilometers) 2.75 
(3.91) 
2.04 
(3.48) 
2.23 
(3.61) 
Values of household assets (Malawi Kwacha) 4168 
(12601) 
3293 
(6794) 
3527 
(8723) 
Whether received free inputs    from government 
(%) 
15 18 16 
Source: Own Calculations from Malawi-IFPRI Survey  
* Figures in parenthesis are standard deviations 
 
About 40 percent of the sampled households were classified as adopters. Table 2 
presents selected characteristics of farmers differentiated by the adoption status of a 
farmer.  They include socio-economic characteristics such as age, sex and education level 
of a household head. We also include wealth status indicators such as land size, the value 
of assets and access to the extension services.  Our a priori expectation is that wealth 
proxy variables will have a positive effect on the tobacco cultivation (Feder, Just and 
Zilberman, 1985). We expect that credit constraints will have a reducing effect on the 
amount of land allocated to tobacco.  We also expect farmers close to extension service 
centers and markets to allocate more land to tobacco  due to the market incentives as well 
as due to access to extension services. 
 
Household characteristics disaggregated by the status of tobacco cultivation of a 
household (Table 3) indicate that tobacco growing households are predominantly headed by 
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males, accounting for 84% of households in the the tobacco growing sub-sample while a lesser 
proportion of 70% of households among the non-tobacco growers were male-headed households.  
The findings suggest that tobacco production in Malawi has a gender face, to the extent that 
women are structurally or otherwise discouraged from participating in the production of the 
lucrative crop. This not unexpected considering that women farmers are likely to face  labor as 
well as liquidity constraints, both of which are key factors in the production of tobacco.  
 
There are no marked differences in terms age, education and wealth (as measured by asset value)   
between tobacco growers and non growers. Tobacco growers, however have access to higher 
values of formal credit (Mk1142) than non-growers (Mk869).  Furthermore,  tobacco growing 
households  have larger households sizes (6.8 persons) than non-growing households (5.3 
persons) and indication of the importance of family labour in tobacco cultivation. Tobacco 
growing households  also have significantly larger (P<0.05) land holdings (2.8hactares) than non-
tobacco groeing households (2.04 hectares). Although tobacco growing households are far from 
the extension workers they are more frequently visited by extension agents than non-tobacco 
growing household. This is consistent with expectation in that tobacco generally attracts more 
attention from government extension agents as well as credit officers who lend to farmers for 
tobacco production and are, therefore, keen to see that the borrowers manage the crop well to 
enable them repay the loan.  
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Table 3: Household characteristics by tobacco cultivation status 
 
Household characteristic 
Tobacco 
growers  
(n=80) 
Non-tobacco 
growers 
(n=324) 
Total 
(n=404) 
Age of head (years) 45.7 (14.1) 45 (13.4) 45.13(13.58) 
Years of schooling of head of household 4.7 (3.3) 4.2 (3.3) 4.28 (3.3) 
Sex of head of household   (1=male, 
0=female) 0.84 (0.4) 0.70 (0.5)*** 0.7 (0.4) 
Population males 15 to 64  years 1.3 (0.8) 1.2 (0.9) 1.2 (0.8) 
Population females 15 to 64   years 1.5 (0.8) 1.5 (0.8) 1.5 (0.8) 
Household size 6.8 (23.0) 5.3 (2.4)*** 5.59 (2.5) 
Total hectares of household land (hectares0 2.2 (1.6) 1.5 (1.2)*** 2.03 (1.9) 
Distance to extension worker’s home ( 
kilometers) 
2.70  
(3.98) 
1.92  
(3.30) 
2.23 
(3.6) 
Values of household assets (Malawi Kwacha) 
3299   
(5862 ) 
3463 
 (1018 ) 
3432 
 (8723) 
Number of visits by an extension agent 7.9 (1.2) 1.9 (1)** 3.0 (1) 
Maximum amount credit accessible (MK) 1142 (1853) 869 (977)**  944 (1280) 
 
Source: Own calculation from RDD/IFPRI Rural Finance Survey 
*** Significant at 1% level 
* Figures in parenthesis are standard deviations  
 
 
 
 
5.0 Results and discussions 
 
Table 4  indicates results on tobacco cultivation disaggregated by liquidity constraint status of a 
household. Although unconstrained households had large land holdings, mean comparisons of the 
incidence of tobacco cultivation between the two categories suggests that there were no 
significant differences. About 18% of the unconstrained households grew tobacco, against 19% of 
the constrained households, and the difference between the two categories of households was 
insignificant. Similarly, there was no significant difference in the size of land allocated to tobacoo 
between constrained and unconstrained households. With regard to the proportion of land under 
tobacco cultivation,  tobacco land accounted for 11% of the total land cultivated.  Furthermore 
there are no significant differences in the proportion of land allocated to tobacco between 
constrained and unconstrained groups.  Based on these findings, we may conclude that the 
relaxation of liquidity constraints has no effect on the amount of tobacco land cultivated.   
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Table 4: Tobacco cultivation between constrained and unconstrained farmers 
 
 Liquidity 
constrained 
Unconstrained Difference All 
Average land holding 
(hectares) 
1.87 2.47  1.4** 2.3 
Percent growing tobacco (%) 18.7 18 0.7 18 
Land cultivated for tobacco 
(hectares) 
0.25 0.27 -0.01 0.26 
% land allocated to tobacco 11 15 4 13 
 
 
But these observed differences between constrained and unconstrained farmers do not tell 
much about the intrinsic impact of relaxing equity constraints on tobacco cultivation. In 
order to clarify this dilemma we apply the counterfactual outcome framework to estimate 
to estimate the impact of relaxing equity constraints on the area of tobacco land 
cultivated. We start with start by applying the propensity score matching methods and 
then later  apply the  TREATREG and IVTOBIT procedures in STATA. 
 
Table 5 indicates estimates of the effect of relaxing equity constraints based on the 
propensity score matching method. The average difference between equity constrained 
households and unconstrained households for the matched cases is considered as the 
average  treatment effect of relaxing equity constraints on the amount of tobacco land 
cultivated. Column 2 indicates the average size of tobacco land among treated cases that 
are matched with untreated cases while column 3 shows the same for the control group.  
The average treatment effect of relaxing equity constraints on the size of tobacco land 
cultivated is the difference in the average land cultivated between the two groups.  In 
general, the impact estimates are quite similar across the three estimation methods, an 
indication of the robustness of the results. However, the impact estimates are not 
significant, suggesting that conditional on propensity scores, relaxing equity constraints 
does not significantly increase the size of the tobacco land cultivated. However, the 
estimates based on propensity score matching may be biased in the presence of non-
compliance and other forms of hidden bias. Furthermore the PSM methods assess the 
effect of relaxing equity constraints on a person randomly selected from the population. 
This parameter is not meaningful as not all farmers can potentially grow tobacco due to 
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land constraints and other preferences. Furthermore we are interested in farmers that are 
eligible to borrow from microfinance institutions for tobacco cultivation. This implies 
that our interest is on a sub-population of farmers that may grow tobacco once equity 
constraints are relaxed through credit. 
 
 
 
Table 5: The effect of relaxing equity constraints on tobacco land cultivated 
 
 Treated Controls Difference=average treatment 
effect on the treated 
t-stat 
Method 1- Nearest neighbor  
No of matched observations 141 85   
Tobacco land cultivated 
(acres) 
  0.04 0.20 
Method 2 – Kernel matching 
No of matched observations 142 85   
Tobacco land cultivated 
(acres) 
  0.04 0.16 
Method 3- Radius matching 
No of matched observations 222 158   
Tobacco land cultivated 
(acres) 
  -0.01 -0.16 
 
Table 6 presents the results on determinants of the amount of land allocated to tobacco 
following the relaxation of equity constraints from the treatment effects model which 
corrects for the endogenous equity constraints and estimated using TREATREG in 
STATA. In addition to the equity constraints variable, we include other variables 
theoretically linked to technology adoption as explanatory variables to assess their effect 
on tobacco cultivation.  
 
Column 2 presents coefficients estimates of the tobacco cultivation equation while 
column 4 presents coefficients for the credit constraint equation. One of the parameters of 
interest, the rho or   which measure the correlation between the errors in the credit 
constraint equation (equation1) and the reduced-form adoption equation (equation 2)  is -
1.08 and significantly different from zero (Chi square=0.0000).   
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Table 6: The effect of relaxing equity constraints on tobacco cultivation -treatment 
regression- 
 
Variables 
Determinants of amount of 
land cultivated for tobacco 
Determinants of credit constraints 
(1=unconstrained, 0=Otherwise) 
 Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. 
Relaxed liquidity constraint 1.0616*** 0.1157   
Age household head -0.0012 0.0036 0.0069 0.0052 
Education head -0.0014 0.0173 0.0398 0.0251 
Gender (1=male) -0.0310 0.1073 0.2823* 0.1499 
 Household size 0.0562*** 0.0199 -0.0050 0.0288 
Total land holding 0.1175*** 0.0332 0.0985* 0.0537 
Maize area -0.0229 0.0311 -0.1320*** 0.0453 
Distance to extension officer 0.0080 0.0147 -0.0080 0.0215 
Distance to commercial bank -0.0232*** 0.0086 0.0043 0.0121 
2nd  Quartile  for  value of assets -0.1072 0.1483 0.2773 0.2072 
3rd  Quartile for   value of assets -0.0133 0.1556 0.1233 0.2241 
4th Quartile for  value of assets 0.0648 0.1598 -0.0516 0.2320 
5th Quartile for  value of assets -0.2054 0.1728 0.2419 0.2480 
Mangochi 1.0613** 0.4678 -0.4016 0.6547 
Nkhota 0.8774*** 0.2859 -0.5850 0.4037 
Rumphi 0.6068*** 0.1799 -0.2021 0.2634 
Dedza 0.2750 0.2014 0.0646 0.2894 
Constant -0.5249* 0.2743 -0.5540 0.3893 
Eligibility for tobacco credit   0.4300*** 0.1094 
/athrho   -1.0852*** 0.1095 
/lnsigma   -0.1282** 0.0514 
Rho   -0.7951 0.0403 
Sigma   0.8797 0.0452 
Lambda   -0.6995 0.0660 
S ource: Own calculation from RDD/IFPRI Rural Finance Survey 
* ,**, ***. Significance at 10%, 5%, and 1 % level,   
Figures in parenthesis are standard errors 
 
 
These findings suggest that the variable (credit constraint) is endogenous and thus we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis for no endogeneity of the credit constraint status of a 
household.  The results for determinants of equity constraints (column 4) show that male-
headed households are less likely to face equity constraints than female-headed 
households. Furthermore, households with larger landholdings are less likely to report 
credit constraints than those with smaller land holdings. The eligibility status of a 
household for tobacco credit (which also used as an instrument) in the regression reduces 
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the propensity of facing equity constraints. This finding suggests that households that 
have an option of borrowing for tobacco cultivation are less likely face equity constraints.     
 
The results on determinants of the amount of tobacco land cultivate (column 2) indicate 
that relaxing equity constraints significantly (at 1%) increases the amount land allocated 
to tobacco. Other variables of importance include gender of household head, household 
size, total land holding size, distance to the commercial bank as well as district dummy 
variable. 
The finding that relaxing equity constraints increases land cultivation tobacco is 
consistent with prior expectations as tobacco is a capital intensive crop require significant 
amounts of fertilize , chemicals and labour.  In the study areas in particular, formal credit is 
provided for farm production as well as for off-farm employment activities and, therefore, these 
results are not unexpected.   .  
 
Labor availability is an important variable affecting farmer’s decision on whether or not to adopt 
a technology. In this study the household size was used as a proxy for labor availability.  The size 
of a household has a positive and significant effect on the size of tobacco land. The positive effect  
can be explained by the fact that tobacco is  a labor intensive crop, and thus households with 
more labour will cultivate more land.  Furthermore, consistent with prior expectation households 
with larger land holdings cultivated more tobacco. 
 
 However, the results in Table 6, do not consistently explain the impact of relaxing equity 
constraints on tobacco cultivation because the dependent variable of interest (land 
cultivated) is left censored and thus consistent estimation of the model has to be done 
using censored models such as the Tobit model or the IVtobit in the case of an 
endogenous independent variable.  The results presented in Table 7 are therefore based 
on the IVtobit regression in which the eligibility criteria for tobacco cultivation is 
included as an instrument. The results show that relaxing equity constraints has a much 
higher effect on the amount tobacco land cultivated. The coefficient of the equity 
constraint variable is larger (8.36), suggesting that relaxing equity constraints increases 
land cultivated for tobacco  by eight (8) acres, much higher than the effect of 1 acres 
reported in the TREATREG model in Table 6. The only other important variable from 
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results in Table 7 is household size and distance to the commercial bank with coefficient 
returning the same sign as in Table6 from the TREATREG estimation. Interestingly, land 
holding size is not significant in explaining tobacco cultivation in Table7. 
 
 
 
Table 7: The effect of relaxing equity constraints on tobacco cultivation –IV-Tobit regression 
 
Variables 
Determinants of amount of 
land cultivated for tobacco 
Determinants of credit 
constraints (1=unconstrained, 
0=Otherwise) 
 Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. 
Relaxed liquidity constraint 8.3615*** 3.4835   
Age household head -0.0216 0.0244 0.0036* 0.0019 
Education head -0.1151 0.1040 0.0132 0.0092 
Gender (1=male) -0.1557 0.7185 0.1208** 0.0580 
 Household size 0.2620** 0.1133 -0.0051 0.0107 
Total land holding 0.2073 0.2330 0.0127 0.0138 
Maize area 0.1861 0.2156 -0.0385*** 0.0148 
Distance to extension officer 0.0534 0.0693 -0.0028 0.0074 
Distance to commercial bank -0.0966* 0.0576 0.0002 0.0046 
2nd  Quartile  for  value of assets -0.9199 0.9735 0.1313 0.0829 
3rd  Quartile for   value of assets -0.1674 0.9742 0.0833 0.0850 
4th Quartile for  value of assets -0.3416 0.9006 0.0068 0.0859 
5th Quartile for  value of assets -1.5858 1.1751 0.1397 0.0939 
Mangochi -3.7317 2.6056 -0.0779 0.2571 
Nkhota 3.9988** 1.9683 -0.1646 0.1567 
Rumphi 2.6512*** 1.0666 -0.0782 0.0955 
Dedza 0.9940 1.2025 0.0361 0.1086 
Constant -6.3521*** 1.9585 0.2798* 0.1481 
Eligibility for tobacco credit   0.1574*** 0.0521 
/alpha   -8.4990** 3.5626 
/lns   0.6118*** 0.1189 
/lnv   -0.7535*** 0.0165 
S   1.8438 0.2191 
V   0.4707 0.0078 
 
The results have interesting policy implications. First the fact they imply that relaxing 
equity constraints through the supply of credit to farmers that are eligible to borrow for 
tobacco cultivation, will potentially increase the amount of land cultivated for tobacco. 
Thus any policy aimed at promoting the production of the country’s green gold should 
consider increasing the supply of credit to the farming households that are eligible to 
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borrow for tobacco cultivation, thus farmers with at least 1 acre of land and those that 
belong to a credit group that is eligible for  credit. 
 
 Other variables  that are insignificant include  the gender of the household-head. The 
results on gender are particularly interesting as the seem to defy the general notion that tobacco is 
a men’s crop, suggesting that once you control for credit constraints gender is not an issue in 
tobacco cultivation. Indeed this concurs with the observation that gender is a social construction  
that is perpetuated based on myths about women’s inability to do things better than men, when 
infact these myths are just aimed at depriving women of the resources required to allow them 
participate in high return investments   Other location dummies of importance that returned 
significant parameters are Rumphi and  Nkhotakota. Households in these districts tend to allocate 
more land to tobacco production than households from Dedza and mangochi  
 
6.0 Conclusions and policy implications 
 
This paper investigates the effect of relaxing equity constraints on the cultivation of 
tobacco. It is motivated by the theoretical assumption that relaxing equity constraints through 
credit provided at market interest rates results into marginal benefits among credit constrained 
households but does no welfare enhancement for unconstrained households. Using a 
counterfactual outcome framework we show that a mere comparison of the average size of 
tobacco land cultivated between equity constrained and unconstrained farmers do not provide a 
reliable estimate of the impact of credit constraints on the outcome of interest.   
The mean comparison of the size of tobacco land cultivated between constrained and 
constrained farmers does not show any significant differences. Furthermore results based on 
propensity score matching also that the impact of relaxing equity constraints on tobacco 
cultivation (ATE) is not significant. However results based on the parametric based methods 
which corrects for the bias associated with being equity constrained (the instrumental variable 
method) show that relaxing equity constraints among a sub-population of individuals that are 
eligible to borrow credit for tobacco cultivation  leads to an expansion the  size of land allocated 
to tobacco..The study findings suggest that extending credit to equity constrained households that 
are eligible to borrow credit for tobacco cultivation can potentially contribute to the expansion of 
land under tobacco cultivation in Malawi..  
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